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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
LOTTIE B. BES.T,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs-

Case No. 8235

MARILYNN HUBER, FRED HUBER
and FRED HUBER COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

f-;TATEl\fENT OF' FACTS
This cause was tried before a jury, in the District
Court For Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for damages suffered in an automobile collision.
On January 16, 1953, plaintiff was a front-seat passenger in her automobile being driven by her husband,
northerly along 11th East Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and the vehicle was stopped at the stop sign for northbound traffic situated at the south of the intersection of
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11th East and 5th South Streets, and had been stopped
a few minutes awaiting opportunity to enter the intersection (R. 31), when plaintiffs' automobile was struck
directly in the rear by a vehicle driven by defendant,
Marilynn Huber (R. 70). Salt Lake Police Officer,
Piers'on, investigated the accident and determined that
11th East Street is 51 feet wide; that the point of impact
was 27 feet south of the 5th South Curb Line and 21
feet west from the east curb line of 11th East Street; that
the plaintiffs' automobile was damaged in the rear (R.
4); that plaintiffs' 1941 Cadillac sedan was moved 15
feet by the impact; that he inspected and checked the
brake pedal of defendant's vehicle and found that the
brake pedal depressed to the floorboard until it was
pumped four or five times, then it stayed up a little
ways (R. 5) and felt fairly solid (R. 12) ; that upon inspection of ground and wheels, no evidence of brake fluid
leaking could be found (R. 5); that the distance within
which a motor vehicle can be halted for an unanticipated
stop under conditions of 11th East Street at a speed of
25 miles per hour is 32 feet braking distance plus 27 feet
reaction distance or a total of 59 feet; at 30 n1iles per
hour the braking distance is 46 feet and the reaction
distance 33 feet, or total of 79 feet (R. 6).

-,
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1
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The defendant, Marilynn Huber, was called to testify
by plaintiff as an adverse party, and testified that she
ha;d driven westerly on 8th South Street to 11th East
Street, having come down the 8th South hill in second
gear and 'braking with the foot brake, traveling at 25 to
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30 miles per hour, and made a right turn at 11th East
Street without coming to a complete stop (R 14 & 15);
that she proceeded northerly along 11th East Street and
from the intersection at 6th 'South Street could see vehicles stopped at the stop sign at 5th South Street (R
16) ; that there were no other cars between defendant's
vehicle and plaintiffs' vehicle and nothing obstructed
defendant's vision as she approached 5th South; that
she traveled in the portion of the street immediately
east of the center line; that no cars were on the right
side of defendant at any time as she approached 5th
South Street (R 17); that she was traveling 20 or 25
miles per hour as she approached 5th South (R 18) but
admitted that she previously testified upon deposition
that she was traveling 23 or 30 miles per hour when she
first applied the brakes (R. 20); that she was 2lf2 to 3
car lengths from plaintiffs' vehicle when she applied her
brakes (R 18); that there were no other cars east of
plaintiffs' vehicle as she approached (R 18); that she did
not remove her foot from the accellerator until she was
about 2lj2 to 3 car lengths a\Yay (R. 19); that when she
first pressed the brake pedal it went to the floor board
and she pumped the brakes two or three times before
the collision (R 21); that she had never previously pumped brakes, but that it was common sense to pump tlie
brakes to add more braking (R 21); that she had ridden
with a boy friend who pumped his brakes as a matter of
habit though his brakes were good (R 22) ; that the hand
brake on defendant's car was in good condition but that
·she did not attempt to use the hand brake; that she did
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not turn easterly to go around the right side of plaintiffs' car because hy the time she pumped the brakes
there was no time to turn (R 22) and she made no attempt
to turn aside to avoid direct collision with plaintiffs'
vehicle (R 70); that she knew the stop sign was at the
intersection of 5th South and 11th East Streets having
traveled this route nearly every day since she started
driving (R 72)

ST'ATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MOTIONS
OF THE DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS, FOR DIRECTED
VERDI·CT AND TO SET ASIDE VERDICT, THERE BEING·
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
AND JUDGMENT.

POINT II.
A P AR'TY IS NOT BOUND BY THE TESTIMONY OF AN
ADVERSE WITNESS WHOM HE HAS CALLED FOR EXAMINATION, EVEN 'TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH TESTIMONY IS NOT REBUTTED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MOTIONS
OF THE DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS, FOR DIRECTED
VERDI·CT AND TO SET ASIDE VERDICT, THERE BEING
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
AND JUDGMENT.
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This court has on many occasiOns stated the rule
regarding the propriety of directing a verdict. A very
recent pronouncement of the rule by this court in the case
of lana Combs vs. William D. Perry, File No. 8097, October 22, 1954, reaffirms the test as to when a motion
for directed verdict should be granted, as follows:
'Taking the evidence, together with every inference fairly arising therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, reasonable minds could
fairly say that they were not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
failed to use reasonable care under the circumstances.
The trial court may not weigh the evidence nor determine
where the preporrderance is, but if there is some substantial evidence in support of the essential facts which the
plaintiff is required to prove in order to entitle her to
recover, or if the evidence and the inferences deducible
therefrom are of a character which would cause reasonable men to arrive at different conclusions with respect

to whether all of the essential facts were or were not
proved, the question is one of fact for the jury and not
one of law for the court. Christensen vs. Utah Rapid

Transit Co., 83 Utah 231, 27 P. 2d 468; Stickle v. Union
Pacific R. Co., ______ Utah ______ , 251 P. 2d 867.
The evidence adduced at trial fairly supports the
verdict of the jury in finding the defendants negligent
in at least one or more of the following particulars:
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(a) Driving a motor vehicle on the highway without
adequate brakes.
(b) Failure to apply the hand brake.
(c) Failure to turn to avoid the collision.
(d) Failure to apply the foot brakes timely enough.
(a) Regarding the negligence of the defendant for
driving with inadequate brakes, the jury was instructed
as follows (R. 27) :
Instruction No. 11
''You are instructed that the law of the state
of Utah as set forth in the State Statutes in force
and effect at the tirne of the accident provided as
follows:
41-6-144
(a) The following brake equipment is
required:
'(1) Every motor vehicle, other than a
rnotorcycle or motor driven cycle when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with
brakes adequate to control the movement of
and to stop and hold such vehicle, including
two separate means of applying the brakes,
each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least two wheels. If these
two separate means of applying the brakes
are connected in any way, they shall be so
constructed that failure of any one part of
the operating mechanism shall not leave the
motor vehicle without brakes of at least two
wheels."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
The defendant, as she drove along 11th East toward
the stop sign which she knew to be at the 5th South intersection, was not faced with an emergency stop, but was
anticipating a stop (R. 72). The defendant admitted
that she had previously testified upon deposition that
she was traveling between 25 and 30 miles per hour when
she first applied her brakes (R. 20). It is common knowledge and practice with every reasonable driver that in
approaching an anticipated stop, the foot brake is gradually engaged to bring the vehicle to a gradual stop.
Officer Pierson testified that for an emergency stop at
a speed of 30 miles per hour the braking distance is 46
feet of solid braking plus a reaction distance of 33 feet,
or a total of 79 feet. Thus if the defendant ha:d been making an emergency stop she would have required 79 feet
to stop from the time she first noticed the necessity for
stopping. The jury could reasonably conclude that the
defendant, in preparing for a known stop, would have to
apply her brakes much in advance of that required for
an emergency stop, and in so doing, if her brakes had
suddenly failed her, she would have known this fact while
she was yet some distance from the plaintiff's car and
would have made an effort to turn, use the hand brake
or otherwise endeavor to avoid the collision. However,
the fact that the defendant stated that she kept traveling
directly towards plaintiffs' car and pumped the foot
brake pedal rather than to employ other methods of braking or attempting to turn as she pumped, is a strong
indication to the jury that the defendant had previously
pumped her brakes and that the brakes after being
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pumped had held on previous occasions but became progressively worse s·o that on this occasion it required
more pumping than previously. rrhis is borne out by the
fact that she claimed never to have been in the ha'bit of
pumping brakes, never knew anyone who pumped the
pedal to correct faulty brakes, and yet she claimed that
instinctively on this occasion she pumped the brakes.
·rhe inference from her testimony is that she would have
eontinued to pump the brakes several1nore times if the
collision ha:d not intervened. The officer testified that he
inspected the wheels and the ground for any leaks in the
brake system and found no evidence of leakage, and that
the brake was fairly solid after being pumped four or five
times, which testimony the jury could consider in negativing a sudden failure of brakes (R. 6). Furthermore,
the claim of the defendant that the brakes upon the next
prior application of the brakes on the 8th South Street
hill, held when only depressed one-quarter of the brake
pedal distance makes it incredible that the brakes would
suddenly fail upon a gradual application for an anticipated stop. These facts reasonably prove that the foot
brake system had been defective for some time and required the pumping procedure before effective operation.
(b) Defendant testified that the car she was driving
was equipped with a hand brake in good operating condition, but that she failed to use the same (R. 22).
The duty of the defendant to have used the hand
brake is stated by necessary implication in the case of
Sams v. Ada.ms Transfer & Storage Co., et al., (:~Iissouri,
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1950) 234 S.W. 2d 593. Plaintiff was a passenger in a
streetcar which was struck at an intersection by a truck
driven by defendant's ernployee. The truck driver testified that as he was approaching the intersection, he stepped on the foot brake and found that it was out of comrnission. He then reached for the hand brake but the
best he could do was to keep the truck, which was going
about 25 miles per hour, from increasing speed. He
sounded the horn of the truck continuously from that
tirne until the truck struck the streetcar. He turned to
the left at the intersection in an attempt to go north on
the west side of the streetcar but because of the speed
of the truck was unable to rnake the turn, and the truck
struck the streetcar. He testified that he had made two
stops that rnorning and that the vacuum booster brakes
operated by a foot pedal were working efficiently, but
failed hirn at this intersection. Judgment for the Plaintiff was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri
which said at page 594:
"As we review the evidence of the truck
driver, Adams was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Conceding that the vacuum booster
brakes were working efficiently that morning and
failed suddenly, the evidence shows the contrary
as to the hand brake.
It is agreed that under the law the truck was
required to be equipped with two sets of adequate
brakes in good working order.... The driver of
the truck stated that when the vacuum booster
brakes failed he attempted to use the hand brake
which 'seemed to hold it (the truck) from going
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much faster but it wouldn't bring it to a stop.'
There is no evidence in this record that the hand
brake failed suddenly. The only inference- to be
drawn from the evidence is that the hand brake
was weak, inadequate, and inefficient. .Adams in
its brief stated that the evidence disclosed the
brakes were regularly inspected. The driver did
testify that 'The equipment is inspected regularly
by the shop.' .As to the meaning of 'regularly'
was are left in the dark. The witness may have
meant yearly, monthly, or daily.... Enough has
been said to show that under the evidence it must
he ruled that .Adams was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law." ... "No evidence was produced in
the case before us of any legal excuse why the
hand brake was inadequate."

1

it

The court then reviews a case cited by .Adams but states
that it is against Adams' theory. This was the case of

Lochmoeller v. Kiel, Mo . .App., 137 S.W. 2d 625, reviewed
at page 595·:
".As we read that case it is authority against
.Adams' theory. The facts in the two cases were
similar except that the collision in the Lochmoeller
case was very slight and the brakes on the truck
failed when an attempt was made to stop the truck
at the stop sign and within a few feet of the streetcar. The plaintiff submitted his case to a jury on
the charge of negligence of defective brakes as a
question of fact. The owner of the truck introduced evidence that the brakes were up to the
time of the collision in good working order and
that .without warning a small gasket had blown
out of the braking mechanism. The court held
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that plaintiff had submitted the question of negligence as one of fact and therefore could not contend on appeal that it was a question of law."
(c) Defendant testified that her vehicle collided
directly into the rear of the Plaintiff's vehicle and that
the reason she didn't attempt to turn one way or the
other was that she didn't have time to do so (R. 70). The
jury could reasonably have found that the defendant
could have turned her vehicle within a much shorter distance than she could have stopped the sa1ne; that if the
defendant's brakes really surprised defendant by sudden
failure, the defendant would and should have turned the
steering wheel, even slightly, at the same time she was
pumping the brake pedal, to avoid the collision. Defendant testified that the lane to her right was clear and open
for travel during her entire approach (R. 17), that there
were no cars on the east side of plaintiff's car (R. 18).
The officer testified that the point of impact was 21 feet
west of the east curb (R. 4), leaving sufficient space for
passing on the right side. From these facts the jury could
reasonably have found that the defendant was negligent
in failing to turn to avoid the collision. The duty of the
defendant to employ other means to avoid the accident
is set forth in the following two cases :R'ussell v. Electric
Garage Co., Nebraska 1912, 90 Neb. 719~ 134 N.W. 253.
Defendant's electric automobile collided with plaintiff's
hack causing personal injuries to plaintiff. From averdict and judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed upon remittur of part of the damages. The facts
are set forth in the following portion of the opinion:
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"The vehicles were traveling in the smne direction, east, and at substantially the same rate
of speed. At the point where they were traveling
there was a slight down grade, but there is no
evidence to show that the street was not perfectly
level north and south between the curbs .... When
he (defendant) finally saw the hack about 25 feet
ahead of hhn, the only effort he made to avoid a
collision was by applying the brakes. When he a pplied the1n the car began to skid. Observing then
that his brakes were not having the desired effect,
we think it was plainly his duty to have used
his steering lever and turned out so as to avoid
the collision. That the mechanism of his car was
all in working order, and that there was ample
room to have passed the hack on either side, is
adn1itted. The driver says he was helpless. That,
under the evidence, is an unwarranted conclusion.
If he had testified that, when he found his brakes
were not going to prevent a collision, he tried to
turn out, but was unable to do so, that claim 1night
have been n1ade with some show of reason. \Ve do
not think it is a sufficient exercise of diligence
by the driver of an automobile, when he sees he
is about to collide with a vehicle of any kind, to use
one of the 1nethods at hand for avoiding a collision, and, when he sees that is not going to have
the desired effect, sit, either helpless or careless,
and fail to use other means at hand .... "
Templeton /rs. l\7 orth ern Te.ras Tractim1 Co., et al., Texas

1919, 217 S.\V. 440. Plaintiff n1otor cyclist was injured
while riding along side of the track of the street rail·way
and a vehicle in front of hin1 turned left without giving

, tan

a signal, and plaintiff also turned left to avoid the truck

' i~l
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but struck an excavation along side the track. The jury
found plaintiff contributorily negligent. The court in
commenting on this contributory negligence stated:
''The plaintiff explains his failure to turn to
the right when the driver of the truck turned to
the left and his failure to shut off the power of
his 1notorcycle or throw out the clutch, or apply
the brake, by saying that it all hap!)ened so instantaneously that he did not have time to think.
It was shown, however that the plaintiff was an
experienced operator of a n10torcycle, that his
machine "Was in good order at the time, and the
jury had an opportunity to observe the plaintiff
during the trial, and we think it was all for the
jury, and that we would not be authorized to set
aside the finding on the ground of an insufficiency of the evidence."
(d)

The jury could reasonably have found the de-

fendant negligent in failing to apply the foot brakes timely enough in that defendant testified that she did not remove her foot from the accelerator until she was about
21f2 to 3 car lengths from plaintiff's car (R. 19). Three
car lengths would be about 60 feet. Defendant was traveling 30 miles per hour when she first applied the foot
brake (R. 20). If, in fact, the defendant waited until
she was 60 feet away before rmnoving her foot from the
accellerator, the jury could find that she would not have
been able to stop, since according to the stopping distances stated by Officer Pierson it would require up to
70 feet even for an emergency stop.
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POINT II.
A PARTY IS NOT BOUND BY THE TESTIMONY OF AN
ADVERSE WITNESS WHOM HE HAS CALLED FOR EXAMINATION, EVEN TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH TESTIMONY IS NOT REBUTTED.

The appellant apparently contends that because
plaintiff called one of the defendants, Marilynn Huber,
as an adverse party, the plaintiff should be bound by the

wh

I Wlll

testimony of the plaintiff. Rule 43 (b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides as follows:

aD!1

I

11VI

I

"Scope of Exam.in,ation and Cross-Examination. A party may interrogate any unwilling or
hostile witness by leading questions. A party may
call an adverse party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation
or body politic or of a partnership or association
which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by
leading questions without being bound by his
testimony and may contradict and impeach him
in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be
contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the
adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by
the adverse party only upon the subject matter
of his examination in chief."
A proper interpretation of this rule is that the plaintiff is bound hy only such testimony of the defendant
as the jury elects to believe. Rulings of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals support the contention of the plaintiff.
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Pittsburgh - Des Moines Steel Co., U. S.
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, July 17, 1950, 183 F·.
2d 467. In the trial of this cause the plaintiff had called
one, Jackson, an officer of the defendant, under Rule 43
(b). The trial court held (86 Federal Supplement 855 at
Page 273) that in calling an adversary, a party vouches
for his testin1ony to son1e extent, and cannot select that
which is favorable and reject that which is unfavorable
where he has not attempted to contradict the unfavorable testinwny. However, upon appeal, the Circuit Court
reversed the district court, and in this point held as follows:
"We find, n1oreover, still a third error in the
trial court's handling of the Jackson testimony
and this one was highly prejudicial. The jury was
instructed, with regard to it, that to the extent
that testimony as produced from a person called
for cross-examination is not rebutted by either direct proof or circumstances it is conclusively taken
to be true. A fair inference frmn the entire charge
was that in the absence of rebuttal the plaintiff
was bound by everything Jackson said.
We do not have here a case in which a party
calls a supposedly favorable witness who gives
unfavorable testimony. It is frequently said in
such situations that the party calling the witness
is bound by his testimony. That rule has been
assailed by Wigmore as a primitive notion which
no longer finds defenders. But we need not in
this case either affirm or repudiate that rule.
Here, Jackson was called in the first place as an
adverse witness under Rule 43 (b), which expressly provides that such an adverse witness may
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be contradicted and impeached. Rule 43 (b), "·r
think, is utterly inconsistent with any notion about
being bound by his testhnony. It seems to us that
any statement to the effect that a party is bound
by the testimony of a witness whom he is free to
contradict and impeach is inherently an01nalous."
None of the cases cited by defendants support the
contention of the defendants that their n1otions for disInissal, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict should be gl'ianted.
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 139, 104 Pac. 2d 772,
(App. Br. 7) was a case where defendant collided with
an rupproaching decedent's vehicle on the decedent's side
of the road. The jury found the defendant to be negligent in spite of defendant's explanation that the decedent first cmne over onto defendant's side of the road and
defendant turned over to decedent's side to avoid decedent when decedent also turned back. The cause was reversed for other reasons, but the court indicated there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict in
favor of plaintiff. The jury apparently did not believe
the explanation offered by the defendant as to why the
collision occurred on the wrong side of the road.
TVhite v. Pinney, et al., 99 Utah 984, 108 P. 2d 2±9,

(App. Br. 8) 'vias a case where the jnry found no negligence upon part of defendant where a wheel fr01n a dolly
being carried on defendant's passing truck, catapulted
fron1 defendant's truck, crossed the street and struck
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plaintiff. The jury apparently believed the defendant's
explanation, and no other evidence of negligence W as introduced.
1

Hanson L Wecherle (Cal. 63 Pac. 2d 323, (App. Br.
9) was not a case of failure of brakes. The decedent in
that case was an assistant to the truck driver. The truck
wasn't functioning properly and each time that the engine failed, the decedent would get out of the truck and
block the wheels ·while the driver started the engine.
This had been done about twenty times, then the last
time, the decedent dismounted from the truck, the truck
moved backward 5 or 6 feet before it stopped. There was
no evidence of faulty brakes. There was evidence that the
decedent may have slipped and fallen under the wheels.
From jury verdict for plaintiff, defendant moved both
for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted motion for new trial but
denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This \Vas affirmed on appeal, the ·court saying that
the questions involved were questions of fact for the
jury and not questions of law to be decided upon appeal.
Trlldeau vs. Sina Contracting Co., 62 NW 2d 492,

cited by the appellant (Appr. Br. 10) clearly holds that
the question of negligence in cases of claimed brake failures is for determination by the jury:
"Ordinarily the condition of brakes and the
1nanner of their use or application, or the failure
to use or apply one or both lines of brakes when
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the situation demanded, would constitute actionable negligence if determined to be a proximate
cause of the collision. But in the light of the testimony presented here the acts and conduct of the
defendants constitute prima facie evidence of
negligence only and, therefore, a proper issue for
jury determination under the charge of the trial
court."
''The existence of an emergency excusing an
act otherwise negligent is, like negligence, ordinarily a question of fact."

Sothoron /c. West, 180 Md. 539, 26 Atl. 2d 16, cited by
appellant (App. Br. 11) was a case tried by the court
without a jury in which the defendant driving a strange
car descended a steep hill, found the brakes would not
hold, tried the emergency brake, but could not stop in
time to avoid collision with rear of plaintiff's vehicle
stopped at a semaphore. Trial court granted judgment to
defendant which was reversed on appeal. The appellate
court commented that it was "almost inconceivable" that
during the course of her travel the defendant would not
have had occasion to use the brakes before arriving at
the steep hill, said nevertheless it was her duty to inspect
the brakes before driving. In that portion of the opinion
quoted by ·the appellant, the court stated that '"If such a
test shows the brakes in working order, and then they
suddenly fail, the driver may not be liable for negligence
in driving with them."
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The foregoing review of the cases cited by the appellant indicates that the determination of the facts by the
jury in cases such as the instant case should not be disturbed upon appeal.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the trial court properly
denied the motions of the defendants for dismissal, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The jury properly found the defendants guilty of negligence in one or more particulars, and this verdict is
amply supported by the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE l{. FADEL
Attorney for Respondent
Bountiful, Utah
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